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ABSTRACT 
Two energy-generating technologies in Britain which transform waste into a resource 
are compared. One is the (in)famous Combined Heat and Power incinerator in 
Sheffield, the other a forgotten biological digester in Devon utilizing anaerobic 
microbes. Both sites are early exemplars of experimental and biopolitical waste 
disposal technologies—incineration and Anaerobic Digestion—now regarded as 
leading alternatives for reducing the United Kingdom’s dependence on landfill and 
fossil fuel; both sites also inspired public resistance at critical moments in their 
development. The analysis here relates how activists and technicians struggle to 
demonstrate competing truths about alternative energy. Through comparison, it 
becomes clear that, beyond the validity of specific truth claims, energopolitics 
mediate the formation of technological legacies. Examining the traces energy 
facilities leave behind—whether in the landscape or online—we ask what it means 
that various claims made about some technical operations endure, while others fade 
into obscurity. [Keywords: Energy, science and technology, waste, Britain, 
demonstration, memory, legacies] 
 
 
Introduction 
Michel Foucault’s (2008) notion of biopolitics describes power over life, a 
characteristically modern form of politics which is intimately linked to statistical 
techniques that allow for the extrapolation from individual lives to populations. As 
such, it has been used to characterize everything from race science to reproductive 
and genomic medicine (see Rabinow and Rose 2006). More recently, biopolitics has 
been extended to infrastructures that sustain lives (Collier and Lakoff 2008, Gupta, 
2012). Here, we examine two examples of such vital infrastructures in the 21
st
 
century: technologies to dispose of English waste. However, the timing also exposes 
other crucial elements, which extend and subvert the idea of biopolitics as initially 
proposed. Many waste technologies are being reformulated as energy-from-waste 
plants, thus merging ideas of health derived from hygiene and warmth, and 
intertwining biopolitics with energy politics. In both of our case studies, public 
bads—domestic and agricultural wastes—are transformed into fuel and electricity, 
and this material alchemy brings with it promises of social reforms, sustainable 
futures, and averted crises. 
Given the interdependency of dominant social and political regimes on energy 
infrastructures (see Mitchell 2011, Boyer this issue), novel energy-from-waste 
technologies such as these portend new biopolitical imaginaries. At the same time, we 
show that local and experimental efforts to supply apparently unproblematic public 
goods of shared health and heat become entangled in a complex politics of energy 
privatization which is supported, even subsidized on occasion, by state agencies. 
Celebrating (or condemning) technical achievements hinges on summoning the right 
audiences to bear witness to the spectacle (see Barry 2001). In our two case studies, 
the picture of benign progress is undermined by the rather unimpressed recipients of 
such munificence. The imbrication of state and corporate interests, public and private 
goods, bio and energopolitics raises the questions of what exactly is being contested, 
by whom, and exactly what “the public” is that is being summoned at different points 
by various parties. As we show, even at the end of these two specific struggles, it is 
possible to draw quite different conclusions depending on who is telling the story and 
whether/how it is successfully retold. 
Biopolitics has been at the heart of waste technology developments in Britain 
since the early 20th century. As these technologies were increasingly seen as a means 
for preserving crowded urban populations from disease, so too did waste management 
experts begin to term their technologies, and profession alike, “modern.” Although 
both are ancient techniques, burning and dumping were thus promoted as a 
thoroughly modern means of collecting and eliminating potentially harmful urban 
waste. It is a striking image: without intervention on an industrial scale, the 
implication was that human bodies might poison the body politic (see Cockayne 
2008). However, it was this very emphasis on care for human and political life that 
also became a point of contestation between waste technologists and their opponents 
in the 20th century as civil society groups mobilized through calls for environmental 
and social justice to campaign against dumping waste near disadvantaged 
communities (see, for example, Bullard 2000). The struggle, discussed here, was 
whether benefit to environmental stability and human life had been displaced by 
short-term profit. The efficacy of both disposal techniques and their management was 
also challenged. Whether or not waste elimination in this form was indeed a public 
good therefore emerged as a central theme, accentuated by the broader political 
climate, where government promoted the private finance and management of 
erstwhile state-operated services and assets. As documented elsewhere (see Ong 
2006:78-79), biopolitics in a neo-liberal context takes on a particular meaning. Here, 
an attempt to maximize apparently uncontroversial goods—the population’s vitality 
and productivity—becomes a subject of debate: what it is, who should control it, by 
what means, and in whose name. 
But this is only half the story. Transforming waste to energy is, again, an old 
practice, but one that has recently been championed as creating yet more public 
goods: fossil fuel alternatives, a solution to climate change, and a steady supply of 
warmth for citizens’ homes. Waste-to-energy technologies present a particularly 
intimate view of public goods bestowed on private lives: the removal of harm, and its 
transformation and return into the domestic sphere as heat, via pipes that materialize 
this link between public and private domains (Marres 2009). The battles that ensued 
over such apparently beneficent technologies suggest indeed that energy—bioenergy 
in this case—is profoundly political, and adds to Mitchell’s (2011) focus on carbon-
based energy as the means to understand modern democracy. The modest 
infrastructures of alternative waste-to-energy systems have not (yet) supplanted 
earlier arrangements premised on fossil fuel and landfill, but they still offer new 
testing grounds for democratic and non-democratic practice. 
The power struggles we outline here suggest that contested views of public 
and private benefit, and the relationship between them, are central to understanding 
this form of energopolitics. More than this, a particular kind of knowing, and 
unknowing, or erasure, also appears as a mechanism of the energopolitics of waste-to-
energy technology development in late 20th and 21st century Britain.  
In the rest of this article, we give the context for the growth of interest in 
waste-to-energy technologies in the UK before turning to two instances: an 
incinerator in the city of Sheffield and an anaerobic digestor in Holsworthy, a rural 
area in southwest England. In both cases, the exchange of domestic or farm waste for 
heat was promised, and the plants’ development was fiercely contested along similar 
lines: the allocation of benefits and costs, or goods and bads, in a shifting landscape of 
commercial, collective, and public interests where appeals to the public good were 
played out at a range of scales, each serving to displace others. The content of the 
public good from these schemes also morphed between an emphasis on environmental 
and human benefit, variously defined at local and global levels.
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In these senses, the struggles over each plant were construed along broadly 
analogous lines. However, this does not explain the curious difference in material and 
virtual legacies within and between these schemes. The Sheffield incinerator remains 
iconic for both protestors, who believe they succeeded in shutting down an earlier 
incarnation, and proponents of the scheme, who hail it as a successful exemplar of 
district heating. Both accounts are still visible on the Internet. In contrast, the fracas 
over the Holsworthy biodigestor has all but vanished. While Holsworthy is largely 
neglected as a forebear to later bio-digestors, both thermal treatment supporters and 
detractors frequently reference Sheffield as, respectively, a model for both the spread 
of a new generation of incinerators, and how incineration can be resisted. Both 
activists and engineers benefit from engaging with sites that allow their truth claims to 
endure. But what accounts for this differential success in not only making claims, but 
making claims which reshape public imaginations of energy, life, and waste? 
We are thus interested in how energy infrastructures and technologies become 
“publicized,” in excess of the outcomes they are designed for. This means tracing 
“public” in its other guise, not merely as the counterpart to a range of differently 
constituted private spheres (Warner 2002:6), but as constituting a collective with 
shared interest. The contested mediation of such sharedness via the fractured public 
sphere has been well documented (see Fraser 1992, Warner 2002), but the question of 
what makes for lasting public engagement—the substance of political participation—
has arguably remained more elusive. In her book, Material Participation, Noortje 
Marres (2012) borrows from the pragmatist tradition of Dewey and Lippmann to 
consider the issue-orientatedness of public engagement. In her account, material 
publics represent “the community of the affected” (2012:50), people with shared 
interest in a common issue of concern. Such concerns are elevated in areas of 
scientific and technological controversy, where social antagonism is mediated by the 
exclusivity of expertise (Wynne 1992). 
In techno-scientific controversies, publics appear in multiple forms. We use 
the concepts of memory and legacy as a key to comparing technocratic experiments, 
and their ability to foster not only health and energy but to sustain engaged publics of 
different kinds, including experts, bureaucrats and financiers, local citizens, 
anarchists, environmentalists, and bloggers. The example of Internet sites is 
particularly useful in exploring the realm of memory because it increasingly serves as 
a record of events, and for that reason, websites could also be described as virtual 
“carriers of democratic process” (Marres 2004). To the extent that material publics are 
brought into being through “issue-networking,” the absence or cessation of virtual 
forms of political engagement is worth noting. 
Scholars in science and technology studies (e.g., MacKenzie and Wajcman 
1999) have noted that forgetting past controversies, innovations whose operational 
success was uncertain, or alternative technological paths is part of the implicit 
material politics of technological change. In our case studies, and as is evident in 
transitions within the waste industry throughout Britain and Europe, past 
controversies and concerned publics are also forgotten to make way for imagined 
national and global futures associated with energy and climate in crisis. As Andrew 
Barry (2001) argues, whether one is an engineer, policy-maker, or an activist, acts of 
truth telling must be anchored in particular sites and moments of demonstration. Barry 
emphasizes that successful demonstrations rely on the figuration of proper witnesses 
to truth, but adds that the particular enactment of demonstrations is also a material 
affair. We argue that as a means of truth-telling about pasts and futures, the Sheffield 
and Holsworthy sites prove variously frail or obdurate, tangible or virtual, dull or 
spectacular. It is for these reasons that the former has endured in public memory and 
imagination, while the other has been largely forgotten. 
 
Regulative Context 
Together, the Sheffield and Holsworthy sites represent early exemplars of what have 
become the main alternatives for dependence on fossil fuel and landfills in Europe 
and elsewhere. The European Commission’s Landfill Directive (1999), Waste 
Incineration Directive (2000), and Renewables Directive (2009) demanded that 
specific member states curtail landfill use, modernize incineration methods, and 
increase renewable energy production, all partly for the sake of reducing carbon 
emissions and averting global climate change. Over the last decade, two different UK 
governments have responded to these directives by encouraging innovation and 
investment in the production of energy from waste, subsidizing the privatization of 
waste management and backing demonstrator projects. In word and action, “waste” is 
being redefined as “resource,” but uncertainties remain and excess or leftover 
remnants haunt the official images of closed cycles of material reuse. 
 
 
The Sheffield Energy Scheme 
Sheffield, in the heart of England’s midlands, is an industrial city, long famous for 
fine cutlery and mass produced steel. Largely as a result of the concentration of steel 
workers, 19
th
 century Sheffield became a center for trade union organization and for 
attempts to resist the expansion of capitalist industry. Following the 1973 oil crisis, 
unemployment rose sharply, but, as the rest of the country came under the sway of the 
neoliberal policies, left-wing politics in Sheffield endured. In the 1980s, a 
conservative member of parliament coined the nickname “The People’s Republic of 
South Yorkshire” for Sheffield and its hinterlands, a name enthusiastically adopted by 
local residents and authorities (Seyd 1990). Having peaked in the 1950s, there was a 
steady population outflow from the 1970s as unemployment levels grew (Winkler 
2007). 
This is the staunchly socialist background to Sheffield’s postwar slum 
clearance and their replacement in the 1960s with huge complexes of public 
apartments on the biopolitical grounds of improving the health, sanitation, and well-
being of the people.
2
 The new complexes were revolutionary in design, incorporating 
the latest social and technical innovations and explicitly following the spirit, if not the 
construction excellence, of Corbusier’s L’Unité d’Habitation in Marseille. Built on 
reclaimed waste ground, each flat was fitted with a Garchey refuse disposal unit: a 
water-borne system “whereby the refuse is untouched by hand from the time it is 
placed in a special kitchen sink unit until it is removed as ash from the incinerator at 
the terminal point of the system” (Sheffield City Council 2010:19). Thus, Sheffield’s 
waste not only provided the ground upon which construction of public housing began, 
but it also provided energy. A network of underground, pressurized hot water 
pipelines joined each apartment to the city’s incinerator, returning waste as underfloor 
heating. One of the largest and most celebrated complexes was Park Hill, which 
opened to great fanfare in 1961
3
 (Watts 2004, Mollona 2009:65). The Park Hill 
complex embodied the seamless connection of private and public life, transforming 
not only waste ground into the latest living conditions but, arguably, transforming 
residents themselves via the exchange of private waste for publically generated and 
redistributed warmth—and thus health and happiness. If coal-producing regions like 
the Midlands helped provision the energic infrastructure of carbon democracies 
(Mitchell 2011), then this was ostensibly socialist planning premised on collective 
benefit from the reuse of refuse, a common image in visions of socialist utopia.
4
 
There were early problems, however. It appears that both the heating system 
and housing complexes suffered from lack of maintenance, in common with many 
other British public housing estates in this period (Alexander 2008). As Abram (2006) 
notes for Sheffield’s Norfolk Park Estate, one of the problems with adequate heating 
supply, as opposed to simply returning heat, was that the flats were single glazed and 
poorly insulated; much heat generated for the public good (admittedly at a fixed 
charge for the recipients) was therefore literally lost to the winds. Memories now of 
life in Park Hill are similarly critical, often centering on those very aspects that had 
once made them so celebrated. As one blogger writes: 
 
Then there was the incinerator: rubbish was burnt in a boiler 
house, and the heat from your junk piped through the radiators 
(for an astronomical fixed fee of £9 per week, summer and 
winter). Sometimes there’d be problems with the incinerator, or 
the wind would blow in the wrong direction: I once found my 
nice new carpet and my son’s toys covered in a thin layer of little 
black specks. In the old days they called it soot and demanded 
clean air! (Jones 2007) 
 
In other words, it was the very material infrastructure that enabled the exchange of 
privately produced waste for public health and warmth that was faulty and was 
experienced simply as a continuation of the bad old days. On an Internet chat forum 
dedicated to Sheffield history, one contributor recalls inadequate garbage collections: 
 
I don’t think they had bins on the upper decks. They didn’t when 
my sister lived there. It would take them a month of Sundays to 
traips [sic] up and down the service lifts to empty them that 
wasn’t already thrown overboard. Wasn’t all this rubbish 
transferred to some “oven, inferno” that heated the whole block. 
That’s what we were all told at the beginning of these 
“beautiful” new blocks of flats, that they were self sufficient 
[sic]. (Sheffield Archives, Ukele Lady 2011) 
 
The last comment is worth noting. It has been suggested that existing neoliberalism is 
fundamentally contradictory, removing the structures and supports to enable more 
deprived members of society to engage in the market on an equal footing. Arguably, it 
is welfare states, as opposed to those committed to minimizing public intervention, 
which provide the requisite support to enable relative citizen autonomy, or as in the 
words of the last quotation, “self-sufficiency”; a particular spin on the notion of 
technologies of power. However, nominal self-sufficiency can be experienced quite 
differently, as the quotation suggests. 
 
 
The Holsworthy Energy Scheme 
Holsworthy is a small market town in the southwest of Britain. The surrounding area, 
irrigated by the Tamar River, has been largely agricultural for centuries. Like most of 
the rural UK, Holsworthy suffered from falling incomes, and rising costs of farming 
in the late 20th century, which were exacerbated by the outbreak of agricultural 
epidemics such as Footand-Mouth and Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) 
(also known as Mad Cow Disease [MCD]). Unlike Sheffield, where the disappearance 
of heavy industry led to net population loss, economic decline in the southwest has 
coincided with population growth. Since the 1980s, the region has grown faster than 
any other in England, by over 13 percent, mostly through migration from London. As 
more English people choose to settle down in the countryside, rural inhabitants have 
to contend with alternative conceptions of “rurality” (Murdoch and Pratt 1993), 
including different ways of valuing the landscape and accompanying shifts from 
agriculture and industry to tourism and a more service-oriented economy (Bouquet 
1982). 
The increasing population in the southwest has coincided with concern about 
growing energy needs and the risks of carbon-intensive energy solutions. In order to 
reduce reliance on fossil fuels, the southwest has been pursuing several alternatives. 
Within the counties on either side of Devon (Somerset and Cornwall), experimental 
nuclear, wind, wave, and waste energy facilities are undergoing development, 
typically with the help of private investors and designs from elsewhere in 
Northwestern Europe. Within rural Devon and neighboring Dorset, however, 
alternative energy has taken a very specific form. 
In the area surrounding Holsworthy, there has traditionally been a high density 
of cow, pig, and chicken feces, or “slurry,” per acre, which began to cause disputes in 
the 1980s over what constituted the countryside’s proper enjoyment and use. It was 
for these reasons that the North Tamar Business Network (NTBN) sought an 
alternative means for disposing of their animal slurries in the early 1990s.
5
  At this 
time, they approached a technical advisor and proponent of rural development, Claire 
Lukehurst, who did an assessment of the area and the technical options available. 
Since the 1970s, farmers throughout the UK have experimented with 
anaerobic digestion (AD)—though this fact is rarely acknowledged in the official 
discourse of the contemporary waste industry or central government, which tends to 
emphasize its novelty as a solution to waste disposal and energy generation. In the 
country’s remaining agricultural pockets, new techniques for harnessing waste were 
adopted in order to dispose of slurry more sustainably and reduce dependency on 
nitrogen fertilizer and fossil fuels. AD is a natural process that involves the microbial 
decomposition of organic materials without oxygen. The products of this process are 
digestate, an odorless, dirt-like substrate high in nutrients, and biogas, a methane-rich 
gaseous mixture exhaled by the microbes. Because digestate does not smell, it does 
not release noxious odors when spread over the fields, as unprocessed slurry does. 
Furthermore, the biogas that comes from anaerobic methanogenesis can be used for 
heat or converted into electricity. 
To harness this process, all that is needed is some method of containing the 
material breakdown particular to AD, whether it is encased underground, as is done 
cheaply throughout the “global south,” or above ground in large tanks. AD not only 
allows the inputs or “feedstock” used to be controlled, but also potentially the pH and 
temperature so that more biogas and better digestate can be extracted per liter of 
biomaterial. 
The existing model of AD plants in the UK was too small-scale to deal with 
the NTBN’s requirements, and would require investment from each individual 
farming household (Reno 2011a). By pooling their resources, Lukehurst and her 
clients reasoned, they could create a bigger digestor that catered to all their farms and 
provided heat for all of them as well as the village. AD, farmers hoped, would not 
only improve their relationships with new arrivals from the city, but also keep their 
farms going by providing an additional source of revenue. Given that the town of 
Holsworthy was in the middle of the region’s greatest density of farms, the AD plant 
could sell its electricity, at a subsidized price, to power the cottage hospital, the old 
people’s home, the schools, and the industrial estate all within half a mile. In this way, 
the plant promised to provide rural development beneficial to all residents while 
simultaneously modernizing and rewarding farms. 
The NTBN decided that a Community Energy Programme Grant (£600,000) 
should be pooled with the EU grant (£3.85 million) and the Non-Fossil Fuel 
Obligation (NFFO) subsidy (a 15-year price of £58 per megawatt of energy produced) 
in order to develop the plant and the local power scheme. On this basis, Lukehurst’s 
proposal was initially approved by the steering group, the local district councils, the 
Environment Agency, and government. In order to help the relevant “decision-making 
farmers” make an informed choice, they traveled to Southern Denmark to visit farms 
and meet the environmental health, veterinary services, and corporate actors who built 
similar plants there.  
According to Derek, one of the local farmers who initially bought into the 
scheme, the businesspeople from Germany were inspirational: “Their enthusiasm 
came all across to the farmers who thought ‘wow!,’ they all saw the pound signs 
going up…They were infected with this enthusiasm and the problem is they hadn’t 
really thought it all through.” 
After initial planning permission was given, and the site built, some local 
opposition died down. In 2001, construction began on the largest and first centrally-
located AD plant in the history of the UK. By 2003, the two 4,000 cubic meter 
digestors were operational under the auspices of Holsworthy Biogas, at a cost of £7.8 
million. Though the local energy scheme had not been completed, the plant could now 
take in residues of the food production system. Local farmers could store most of their 
slurries in collection pits and trucks would come to exchange it for biofertilizer from 
the plant. 
 
 
The Sheffield Incinerator and Its Qualified Success 
Five years after completion of the Holsworthy plant, anaerobic digestors would be 
championed by various UK government agencies as a leading waste disposal method 
of the future, at the same time that more established waste disposal methods—landfill 
and incineration—were becoming targets for European governance. 6  Just as the 
Holsworthy digestor was becoming operational, changes in incinerator regulation 
were being introduced across the continent. Anticipating the 2000 EU Incineration 
Directive, Sheffield’s public-private partnership for managing municipal waste, 
Sheffield Heat and Power Ltd.,
7
 began to upgrade their elderly incinerator at 
considerable cost (£25 million), simultaneously extending the reach of the heating 
network (currently over 44 kilometers) to heat public buildings and more residential 
districts (Owen 1992). Abram (2006) notes that this very improvement also presented 
challenges to the next cycle of destruction and renewal of the housing complexes 
since many of the original construction plans disappeared and with them, it is said, 
common knowledge of many of the underground pipes and unstable geology of the 
area. 
In May 2001, a French waste management company, Onyx, later renamed 
Veolia Environmental Services, was awarded a 30-year contract to manage 
Sheffield’s integrated waste services starting in August 2001. While Veolia 
Environmental Services presents the upgrading and enlargement of Sheffield’s district 
heating system as a seamless story of continuous improvement for public benefit, 
there have been several controversial and well-publicized interventions by anti-
incineration activists. 
The same month that the contract was awarded to Veolia, Greenpeace activists 
climbed the 75 meter high incinerator chimney and painted “toxic waste” in huge 
white letters down it. Five activists camped on the chimney for three days, capping it 
with a tarpaulin decorated with a skull and crossbones, while another six protestors 
chained themselves to machinery in the main areas for receiving waste. Citing 
Environmental Agency statistics, Greenpeace claimed the protest was lawful, 
suggesting that “[the] Sheffield incinerator is the worst in Britain and has broken legal 
pollution limits 178 times in the past 3 years” and that their action was the “equivalent 
of a citizen’s arrest of a repeat offender” (Greenpeace). Sheffield Council applied for 
and obtained an injunction to end the protest. The protestors were tried, released, and 
claimed the action to be a victory in preventing toxic pollution for three days. The 
entire protest was covered on national television. 
On June 25, Onyx announced that it would close the incinerator, since the 
costs of increasing standards to meet the Waste Incineration Directive would exceed 
that of constructing a new plant. Anti-incinerator activists hailed the closure of the old 
incinerator as a triumph. The problem with framing public concern in terms of the age 
and quality of a technology, however, is that it implies that the way forward is newer 
and better technology. Not long after the closure, it was announced that a new, larger 
capacity, more technologically-advanced plant would be opened in Sheffield. Planned 
for 2006, the new incinerator was now christened an “Energy Reclamation Facility” 
(ERF) and equally celebrated as state-of-the-art technology by Onyx and Sheffield 
City Council that would provide both electricity and heat to the district heating system 
and to the citizens of Sheffield in their homes and public buildings. 
The protestors continued their campaign. On September 29, 2003, a 
demonstration was held in Sheffield’s city center with, among the speeches, a song 
based on Pink Floyd’s anthem “Another Brick in the Wall”: 
 
We don’t need incineration 
We don’t need this dirty air 
Birth defects and cancer clusters, 
Kids with asthma everywhere. 
 
Hey, Onyx, leave those kids alone! 
We don’t want another...brick in the wall. 
 
We all want our waste recycled 
It’s a crime to burn it all 
Precious oil lost forever 
Global warming haunts us all.
8
 
 
The protestors were campaigning for less emphasis on incineration (presented 
by the City Council and Veolia as the only pragmatic option for effective municipal 
waste management), and more prominence given to recycling and composting. The 
campaign made extensive use of the Internet.
9
 Central to the campaign’s validity were 
also letters to the Council from local medical doctors suggesting that the incinerator 
was harmful to local public health. 
In 2008, Veolia submitted an application with the Council to extend the 
catchment area for the ERF, drawing in the waste of three more local towns: 
Doncaster, Barnsley, and Chesterfield. The justification was that wastes collected for 
the ERF had declined since the contract was first signed, meaning that this income 
stream could not be realized; forecasts indicated a continued downward trend. The 
perceived expansion of Veolia’s original remit continues to be contested locally as 
activists describe this move as transforming Sheffield into Yorkshire’s rubbish bin. 
The struggle continues. 
 
 
The Holsworthy Digestor and Its Productive Failure 
Shortly after the new ERF was built in Sheffield, the new anaerobic digestor in 
Holsworthy was declared a failure. Despite the optimism and enthusiasm associated 
with the plant’s conception and development, after a few months it became apparent 
that its business model was not viable. According to informants, Strathclyde 
University first reported on the problem, concluding that the primary feedstock was 
not viable for gas production and that government subsidies or more gate fees would 
have to subsidize it.
10
 
Eventually, the public limited company that owned and operated the plant 
declared bankruptcy. This spurred a management buyout and a reorganization of 
funds that involved more investment on the part of local farmers. Summerleaze 
Andigestion, the private firm that eventually purchased the plant, later claimed that 
abandoning this agricultural model and taking in more food waste and other food 
residues could solve its commercial woes. As with the Sheffield incinerator, “the 
public” supplying the facility had to change—when closed loops prove economically 
unviable, they require supplementation through non-local and delocalizing 
commercial contracts. The initial planning application for the Holsworthy digestor 
included a fraction from other food residues, particularly animal by-products like 
abattoir waste. Initially, the idea was that this would provide enough additional 
revenue from gate fees to subsidize free disposal of local farm wastes. In the early 
years, the plant supported 120,000 tons of cattle, pig, and poultry manure annually 
and 30,000 tons of additional residues from the food production system. With so 
much material, roughly 80 percent, entering the plant at no charge, it was difficult to 
run at a profit. The difference could be made up in the sale of biogas for energy, at a 
subsidized price, as planned, but as the Strathclyde report demonstrated, cattle slurries 
limit gas production when compared with other food residues.
11
 The alternative that 
the new firm proposed and pursued was to take waste from outside the community in 
greater amounts, just like Veolia’s proposal for Sheffield’s incinerator. A year after 
Summerleaze made the acquisition, they applied for planning permission to change 
their feedstock limitations.
12
 
Part of the flaw with the original financial model, in other words, was that it 
eschewed profitability and energy productivity in favor of a technology that would 
primarily take community wastes and return them to the community in the form of 
heat and fertilizer. From the beginning, however, the Holsworthy plant faced 
difficulties acquiring the funds to create its heating scheme. The energy company 
established to manage the project successfully sold electricity to the national grid, but 
could not finance the local heating scheme. The initial cost of the project was just 
under £2 million and the Community Energy Programme Grant provided barely 25 
percent. With an estimated net cash flow of £375,000 after 20 years, moreover, the 
plant could not find private investment to make up the difference. Energy was being 
sold on the national grid at a premium price, but because of insufficient funds from 
the grants they received, the pipelines laid in the ground were never hooked up to 
provide heat to local community buildings as promised. Whereas the actual network 
of pipes in Sheffield were lost to memory in Holsworthy they only ever existed 
virtually, in the original designs of Lukehurst and the NTBN. With fuel poverty a 
growing national concern, local council housing would still benefit from completing 
the project, but Summerleaze struggled to find enough public or private funds to 
realize its original ambition. 
When local opposition began to grow towards the Holsworthy digestor, it was 
not in terms of this unfulfilled potential, but perceived threats to animal health and the 
spread of odor, as well as inadequate roads.
13
  In 2007, several locals met their 
Member of Parliament in order to prevent Summerleaze from gaining permission to 
increase their intake of wastes from outside the community. According to Derek: 
 
They’d already been bringing up more and more food waste and 
blood and slaughterhouse waste…We were told that the plant 
was supposed to be about, you know, cow manure basically. So 
that basically started us off protesting…It came about fairly 
quick, I suppose, we called ourselves just the Holsworthy 
Biogas Protest Group [HBPG]. 
 
The HBPG started up a website forum to express local concerns about the plant and 
spread information to other communities about the risks of poorly run AD operations. 
According to members of the HBPG, Summerleaze “started to sneak food 
waste in” before the planning application was approved, after they failed to collect 
enough poultry and pig manure.
14
  This included contraband seized by HM Customs 
and Excise—such as tobacco, perfume, and alcohol; glycerine from a Devon biofuel 
plant; and waste from fish markets in Plymouth and Newquay, other southern towns. 
With such a variety of biological wastes from all over the Southwest, some local 
residents became alarmed at what they saw as possible danger. For farmers and rural 
dwelling people, these risks evoked memories of the costs and fears associated with 
the Foot-and-Mouth epidemic of 2001, an outbreak that sorely affected relatively poor 
areas of the Southwest. According to another member of the HBPG: 
 
Now BSE, CJD [Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease], Foot-and-Mouth 
was all imported from other countries to the point of 
distribution. Right? Now, when they decided to use cattle offal, 
cattle blood, I thought of them slaughter houses, I’m thinking 
they go to the slaughter houses because there’s something wrong 
with ‘um. So what disease are they gonna bring to Holsworthy 
and spread around our local farms? 
 The fear of inadequate pasteurization and the possibilities of disease transmission are 
especially acute because of the sense that the wastes going to the plant are not only 
from familiar farms in the area, but potentially from all over England and abroad as 
well. These concerns are especially salient to an aggrieved farming public that has 
learned to mistrust technocratic assurances. The Holsworthy plant is designed to 
contend with such uncertainties, primarily by assuring that temperature levels in the 
tanks remain high enough to destroy potential contaminants. But, as Hinchliffe (2001) 
argues, such technical fixes only appear to resolve what are much more open-ended 
and indeterminate risks, which, in the case of animal epidemics in particular, tend to 
involve much broader geo-political relations (see also Law and Mol 2008). 
With concerns about traffic, safety, odor, and disease transmission, the HBPG 
continued to update their (now defunct) website, call public meetings, circulate 
petitions, distribute fliers, and link their activities to other groups experiencing similar 
problems elsewhere in Britain. But in 2009, the HBPG abruptly disbanded. According 
to Derek, speaking on behalf of the group, “We feel we’ve come a long way and think 
the plant is helping the public. There is a much better set up now than in the past and 
they should be praised at Summerleaze.” The original protest group targeted the 
operations of the plant in particular and therefore ceased to exist once this issue 
appeared to be resolved.
15
  Arguably, unlike an environmental institution like 
Greenpeace, the HBPG lacked the organizational memory and material resources for 
its protest to remain visible and endure after it had concluded. 
As with the Sheffield incinerator, however, this resolution is incomplete. The 
members of the HBPG now campaign for the provision of proper roads to support 
vehicles on their way to and from the site. It is this infrastructure that concerns them, 
and not the original energy scheme designed to benefit the wider community. That the 
roads are now the primary matter of concern for “the community of the affected” 
(Marres 2012) is at least partly because the cause for their involvement came out of 
private commercial and domestic interests—being protected from harm and nuisances 
and maintaining property values—rather than the more ambitious agenda of 
reforming the distribution of energy. The latter would have required a much more 
radical change in local energopolitics, beginning with putting pipes in the ground. In 
2013, the energy scheme remains underfunded and incomplete. 
Despite the resolution of differences between Summerleaze and the HBPG, it 
could be argued that neither group succeeded in wholly demonstrating their truth 
claims to wider publics on a national scale, as both Sheffield’s engineers and 
protestors have arguably done. By 2007, while Holsworthy continued struggling to 
finance its local heating scheme, smaller-scale, less collectively-based forms of AD 
were being promoted by government agencies and new waste industry start-ups as a 
primary disposal method—alongside incineration—for meeting renewable energy 
needs and reducing carbon emissions and reliance on landfills. And yet, most of the 
ensuing national and international discussions of this method failed to acknowledge 
the difficulties that the implementation of AD faced in Holsworthy, or recognize its 
potential as a model to be duplicated (or avoided) in the future, even as similar 
Northern European technology from Denmark and Germany was increasingly adopted 
throughout the UK (with similar consequences, see Reno 2011b). The removal of the 
HBPG website, furthermore, disallows environmental justice activists from learning 
from their example, as they might from Greenpeace’s archived documentation of the 
Sheffield actions. 
 
 Conclusion: Spectacular Contests 
There are striking similarities and differences in these accounts of Sheffield’s 
incinerator and Holsworthy’s digestor. Most obviously, they involve the alchemical 
transformation of waste into forms of value. The wastes we consider—farm and 
domestic—are perceived and engaged with differently by different publics: some 
farmers would gladly spread untreated manure on their fields and some people would 
happily hurl offal from their open windows onto the streets. It is arguably the 
polyvalency of waste that makes it an attractive area for socio-material 
experimentation: a bad that can be made to do good and therefore allow for 
alternative biopolitical futures to be imagined, carved out from the prevailing 
energobio- political regime of fossil fuels and landfilling. Both case studies also 
foreground a number of linked concerns that characterize contemporary energo-
politics in England: the shifting (moral) landscape of public and private regulation, 
ownership, and finance; contested ideas of what constitutes public or communal 
goods and bads; and the proliferation of different publics who are enrolled, mobilized, 
appealed to, and used as a source of legitimation by various parties at different times. 
The way that these publics take form, and do or do not last, hinges in part on the 
materiality of participation (Noortje 2012) and involves distinct scales of 
environmental and social benefit. 
European regulation over waste technologies was responded to in England by 
government financial support for local administrations to privatize waste management 
on the one hand and to run “demonstrator” projects of “new” alternative technologies 
on the other (Reno 2011b). In Sheffield and Holsworthy, local and national perception 
of the respective technology took a critical turn as local municipal or community 
ownership of the sites changed to private hands and the ideological narrative of public 
gift was jeopardized. This critical turning point allows us to trace the social fault lines 
that emerged as “black boxes” were opened and matters of fact became matters of 
concern for affected publics (Latour 2005). Shifts in ownership were accompanied by 
technical innovations to bring better profits and reduce risks, and such changes 
developed in concert with the concerned publics they engender (Marres 2009:119). 
What was evident in both cases was that the old line that private vice, or profit 
maximization, leads to public benefit did not hold among certain groups of the 
affected, or at least was fiercely contested. As “gift-giving” technologies changed 
how they operated, the recipients of transformed wastes also shifted in scale. Thus, 
both private firms sought to extend their catchment areas to realize incomes streams 
based on throughput. This problematized the argument that these were local concerns 
and, far from being an easy translation to public benefit, was contested in both cases 
as damaging to local well-being. 
What exactly counted as a public good was clearly not straightforward either. 
Ideas of the public good have variously appeared here as: enjoyment of the 
countryside as landscape, poverty reduction, efficient domestic and farm waste 
disposal, free fertilizer, sanitation, warmth, and a reduction in carbon use and methane 
production. Not only do these goods appear to be rivalrous, but the validity of some 
claims was questioned. Thus, the warmth supposedly generated from the original 
Sheffield incinerator was, according to bloggers’ memories, faulty: the apartments 
were poorly glazed and insulated, the pipes incorrectly calibrated, and the incinerator 
often failed or emitted pollution—thus harming, not improving health—and provided 
costly, not cheap, electricity and heat. The anti-incineration activists also claimed that 
dioxins produced by thermal combustion were injurious to health. Similarly, the 
additional feedstock that Summerleaze sought to acquire (and according to some, was 
already acquiring illegally) was meant to sustain the viability of the biogas enterprise 
in Holsworthy, while members of the HBPG identified it as a possible source of 
disease. 
Added to this mix was the mutating nature of the publics which were 
supposedly enjoying the benefits. Protestors, municipalities, engineers, and 
companies all engaged different publics with their truth-telling performances. And 
there is no reason that forums assembled through official planning approval meetings 
are any more salient than the readership of a blog on Sheffield history, nor can we 
assume that Summerleaze and Veolia or Greenpeace and the HBPG appeal to the 
same publics, when some fail to cohere and others appear to last. The narratives of 
some publics remain durable even after the shared problems that initially bring them 
together and material sites that organize them fade away. The enduring influence of 
Sheffield’s waste technicians and activists is clearly rooted in actual pipes connected, 
if now forgotten, and actual stacks climbed and graffitied, if now only visible on the 
Internet. With this shift in the particular materialization of truth-telling sites—whether 
in the ground or online—one can identify a fragmentation of different publics, a loss 
of meaningful overlap, and shifts in scale. Advocates of thermal combustion 
presented Sheffield’s incinerator as a success on the grounds of pragmatism—a 
bottom line as it were that brooks no dissent—and by appeal to a global humanity that 
profits through carbon reduction. This larger public effectively trumps local claims, 
even if those are for the city of Sheffield. 
This shift of scale in publics is a tipping point in both instances. The bio-
political projects of the state, classically enacted through large-scale infrastructural 
projects for the well-being of the population here shift to private operators (Veolia 
and Summerleaze), operators that would not exist at all were the business of waste not 
privatized to begin with. They are thus able to profit by taking private/domestic waste 
and charging both for the removal of threats to the health of the local and global body 
politic and for the provision of power to private and public buildings alike. Arguably, 
the energo-politics at the heart of new energy technologies and their infrastructures 
are made explicit through legitimating appeals to a vast public good of carbon 
reduction and the spectacular creation of grand material and social technologies for 
waste collection and power redistribution. But the politics at the heart of these energy 
enterprises simultaneously disappear precisely because the scale has shifted from the 
local, even the local monumental, to a notion of a global good. 
The last point that connects these concerns is the longevity (or otherwise) of 
alternative claims and voices. Since many of the disputes were themselves about 
different understandings of the legacies of planned energy-from-waste developments, 
the durability of the incinerator’s protest on the Internet, as opposed to the 
ephemerality of the digestor’s protest group’s website and arguments is worth 
puzzling through. We suggest that what appears here is a particular form of 
spectacular energy politics, where some claims are recognized and live on in public 
memory, while others are not only trivialized into obscurity, but must be erased to 
allow the trope of continual innovation to succeed. Unlike Debord’s (1992) view of 
spectacular politics, however, not all subversive claims to truth are simply removed or 
reincorporated: the highly visible protest of the antiincinerators lives on alongside the 
new incinerator in a virtual domain. Each instance reveals different engagements with 
public spectacle as a form of technological legitimation. This, therefore, offers a 
different take on the familiar question of how and why some technologies are taken 
up and others are not (Bijker 1995, Geels and Schot 2007, Geels 2006). 
Tracing the controversies that routinely unfold over governmental and 
corporate promotion of purportedly “new” energy technologies, the types of 
resistance, negotiation, and collusion they engender, and their legacies is instructive. 
This “newness” responds to a framing of development and progress, but often 
depends on selectively forgetting what came before and thus obscuring what else 
could come to be. Thus, the struggle to introduce new energy-from-waste 
technologies is not only about the particularities of technical innovation, but involves 
the mediation of public memory and technological imagination, both on and offline 
(Clark 2007; Cooper 2008, 2010; Alexander and Reno 2012).  
At the very least, this suggests that there is something about the spectacular 
and the grand in energo-projects that gives a curious longevity and stickiness to the 
politics with which they are imbricated. At a simple level, claims of success and 
defeat (whether by technocratic or anarcho-environmentalists) are simply fought out 
in wider public spheres and more can be made of bigger, ambitious technical 
spectacles. If this is the case, then there is a sharp lesson to be learned from the fact 
that small-scale, often rural energy experiments are easily, or indeed functionally, 
forgotten by engineers, policy makers, or activists in campaigns to increase the use of 
AD. 
Key to these two accounts of contested waste technologies and their equally 
contested success or failure is the notion of demonstration: the spectacular allows for 
a sense of public confirmation that these technologies work or do not. The 
unspectacular disappears from view, and, with such evaporations, the memory of 
lessons learned equally vanishes from sight—and thus from the narrative of 
technological progress. Without incorporating the memories and legacies of small-
scale experiments into the hesitant advance of different technologies, we fail to 
understand what is happening on and in the ground. The question that, therefore, 
remains is how to concoct smaller-scale energy experiments that affect and enrapture 
the right publics. 
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Endnotes: 
 
1 The conceptualized divide between public and private spheres varies depending on socio-political and 
historical context (Rössler 2004), and is arguably linked to forms of biopower (see, for example, 
Santoro 2009). Our use of the public/private binary to discuss the apportioning of goods is intended to 
highlight the importance of this ideological division of spheres for liberal and neoliberal rationalities of 
governance, while showing the mutability of what these terms actually mean in practice. 
2This was the culmination of the 1935 representations made by Dr. Rennie the City Public Health 
Officer on the damaging effect of crowded slum dwelling on health (Sheffield Archives: CA-MIN/74, 
p. 221 as quoted in Sheffield City Council 2010) 
3 The municipal administration printed a brochure on the city’s new housing schemes in, among other 
 
 
languages, French and Russian (Abram 2006). 
4 Fellow exiles Victor Hugo and Pierre Leroux were vocal proponents of the “circulus,” a vision of a 
socialist utopia where the sewers of Paris would be tapped as a vital resource (Reid 1993:54). Leroux 
developed this notion as a solution to the population crisis proposed by Malthus; if the circulus were 
adopted in Paris, he wrote, “Each would religiously gather his dung to it to the State, that is to say the 
tax-collector, in place of a tax or personal levy. Agricultural production would double immediately and 
poverty would disappear from the face of the earth” (as quoted in Reid 1993:55). 
5 Small firms like the NTBN represent a growing British tendency, with the widespread mechanization 
of farm labor in the early 20th century, for interfarm cooperation to consist primarily of contract-based 
specialized enterprises (Jones 1973:46). 
6  The Department for Environment, Food, and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) sponsored special 
demonstrations to test the viability of AD (Reno 2011b) and the Office of Gas and Electricity Markets 
incentivized the sale of electricity from Anaerobic Digestors to fulfill renewable energy quotas (Reno 
2011a). Similarly, quasi-NGOs under the auspices of DEFRA, such as the Waste and Resources Action 
Plan, worked to establish quality standards for the sale of digestate as fertilizer. 
7 Sheffield Heat and Power Ltd. (including British Gas and Sheffield City Council) was set up in 1984, 
and became operational in 1987. In the late 1980s, a heating pipe network began to be extended to 
include Norfolk Park complex in order to heat public apartments there. The cost was passed on to 
residents. The pipelines were abandoned and were not used in subsequent retrofits of the public 
housing complexes that are now sold as private apartments. 
8 Such protest songs and chants are themselves “carriers” (Marres 2004) that facilitate democratic 
action among certain publics, that is, they are a way of aligning different people according to shared 
backgrounds; those who know Pink Floyd would identify this song as one of rebellion, here reframed 
to target the eco-themes of environmental justice, global warming, and recycling. 
9  The campaign website is still accessible online at 
http://www.greenpeace.org.uk/search/node/Sheffield%20incinerator. 
10 Some experts on AD claim that the large-scale nature of the project was to blame, constructed on the 
model of larger digestors of continental Europe, where smaller-scale AD plants tailored to individual 
farms are more sustainable in the long run. “This was supposed to be the future!” AD inventor James 
Murcott would later tell us, and yet it was not helping to create sustainable, profitable agriculture as 
promised. 
11 Moreover, with the introduction of the Renewables Obligation (or RO) in 2002, the guaranteed 
NFFO price was far less attractive. ROC prices in the mid-2000s were peaking at £90 per megawatt, 
nearly twice the value of the contracted price that the Holsworthy plant had received. The RO was 
being touted as the future of policy at the time (see Reno 2011a), as it commoditized renewability as a 
separate revenue stream from the sale of the electricity itself. 
12 Using more food waste as feedstock for the plant, they claimed, would increase gate fees and the 
production of saleable gas. Food waste has twice the gas potential of cattle slurry and people will pay 
the plant to take it. 
13 Shortly after taking control of the plant, Summerleaze attracted public scorn for its involvement in an 
environmental leak in nearby Boyton in 2006. Summerleaze reported to the Environment Agency that 
slurry had escaped from one of its 300,000 liter holding tanks and entered the River Tamar, where it 
reportedly killed multiple fish (Lets Recycle 2006). 
14 Poultry and pig manure were important to the scheme because, unlike the dairy farmers who had 
helped finance the project, they were counted on to pay a fee to use the plant. According to some, there 
were difficulties getting the digestor to process chicken droppings and the biggest pig farmer in the 
area refused to pay for the service. 
15  This resembles how those affected by demonstrator waste sites elsewhere in the country saw 
differences resolved through technical innovation and adjustment on the part of offending plants (Reno 
2011b). 
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